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EN BANC PROCEDURE IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
OF APPEALS
Although there are more than three judges in all but one of the
circuits,' cases in the federal courts of appeals are normally heard and
determined by three-judge panels. 2 The panel system enables the courts
to cut more effectively into crowded dockets, but at the expense of uniformity. Under such a system, the same court in the form of two different
panels may reach contradictory results in cases which appear to be indistinguishable; and since the courts of appeals are often courts of last resort,3
panel conflict may go unresolved. To secure uniformity, therefore, the
courts of appeals have been authorized to sit en banc 4 to resolve panel
conflict.
There is littI doubt that the en banc procedure, although otherwise
useful as a means of bringing particularly important issues to the attention
of more judges, was developed for the resolution of intracircuit conflict.
The procedure was first sanctioned by the Supreme Court as a means of
fulfilling this purpose in Textile Mills Sec. Corp. v. Commissioner,5 after
the Courts of Appeals for the Third 6 and Ninth Circuits 7 had split over
whether the court had the power to convene itself en banc. Legislative
history of the statute authorizing the en banc procedure also indicates that
it was designed to achieve intracircuit uniformity.8
The en banc procedure has, however, opened up "new complexities in
federal practice." 9 The Judicial Code provides:
Cases and controversies shall be heard and determined by a
court or division of not more than three judges, unless a hearing
or rehearing before the court in banc is ordered by a majority of
'At present, the composition of' the courts of appeals is as follows: District of
Columbia Circuit-9; First Circuit-3; Second Circuit-9; Third Circuit-8; Fourth
Circuit-5; Fifth Circuit-9; Sixth Circuit-6; Seventh Circuit-7; Eighth Circuit
-7; Ninth Circuit-9; Tenth Circuit-6. 28 U.S.C.A. § 44 (Supp. 1961).
228 U.S.C. §46(b) (1958).
SE.g., Textile Mills Sec. Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U.S. 326, 335 (1941)
(dictum). As compared to 971 certiorari petitions from the courts of appeals filed
during fiscal 1960, the Supreme Court granted only 102. 1960-61 ADMINISTRTrvE
OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS ANN. REP. 226.
4 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1958).
56 314 U.S. 326, 335 (1941) (dictum).
Commissioner v. Textile Mills Sec. Corp., 117 F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1940), aff'd,
314 U.S. 326 (1941).
7Lang's Estate v. Commissioner, 97 F.2d 867 (9th Cir.), certified questions considered, 304 U.S. 264 (1938).
8 H.R. REP. No. 1246, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) ; Hearings on S. 1053 Before
a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 14-16

(1941).

9 Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R., 345 U.S. 247, 274 (1953)
(Jackson, J., dissenting).
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the circuit judges of the circuit who are in active service. A
court in banc shall consist of all active circuit judges of the
circuit.' 0
Although it specifies who shall order an en banc proceeding and who shall
sit on the court en banc, the statute does not detail any en banc procedure.
In Western Pac.R.R. Corp. v. Western Pac.R.R.,11 the Supreme Court,
after holding that a litigant cannot compel the full court to formally consider an en bane application and that the statute does not compel any particular en banc procedure, attempted to establish certain en banc requirements: (1) the courts of appeals should make clear to litigants the method
by which the court en banc is convened; (2) the decision to sit en banc
may be made by the full court, or it may be delegated initially to the hearing
panel, although the full court retains the authority to revise the en banc
procedure and to withdraw the delegated power; indeed, the courts must
constantly consider whether their rules promote the purpose of the en banc
statute; (3) litigants should be able to suggest that a particular case is
appropriate for en banc determination, but these suggestions should not
be treated like motions and should not require formal action by the court;
(4) the courts may initiate en banc proceedings sua sponte; (5) whether
to rehear a case before the panel or the court en banc are two separate
questions which should be considered independently. "[T]he three judges
who decide an appeal may be satisfied as to the correctness of their decision. Yet, upon reflection, after fully hearing an appeal, they may come
to believe that the case is of such significance to the full court that it deserves the attention of the full court." 12 Perhaps because of the generality
of the Western Pacific standards and the large area of discretion left to
the courts of appeals, en banc procedure throughout the circuits is not
entirely consistent with Western Pacific and is by no means uniform.

I. A SuRVEY

3

OF THE: CIRCUITS 1

The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, unlike other
courts of appeals, does not specifically mention en banc hearings and
rehearings in its rules. 14 Nevertheless, the procedure is employed by that
circuit and may be invoked at various stages of the litigation. In rare
1o28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1958).

11345 U.S. 247 (1953).
12 Id.at 262-63.
13 The First, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits will not be considered. The First
Circuit has only three circuit judges. Although the Fourth Circuit does have five
circuit judges, the number was only recently increased from three, and as yet there
have been no en banc problems. Letter From Hon. Simon E. Sobeloff, Chief Judge,
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Dec. 27, 1961. The Seventh Circuit has
apparently developed no en banc procedure. See Note, 22 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 482,

487 (1954).
14 See D.C. CIm. R. 26.
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instances, a majority of the active circuit judges may order a case to be
heard en banc even before it has been assigned to a panel by the clerk. 15
After assignment to a panel, either a panel judge or a judge not assigned
to the case may, at any stage in the case, request a hearing or rehearing
en banc by circulating a supporting memorandum to the other active circuit
judges and asking them to notify the chief judge of their vote.' 6 Such
action is often prompted by the draft opinion of the panel which is circulated before filing among the nonsitting judges.' 7 The practice of
circulating draft opinions enables the other judges to make an informed
decision on the en banc question without extensive effort to become acquainted with the issues in the case.' 8 This practice has been criticized,
however, primarily because it permits judges to whom the litigants were
unable to argue their views to exert considerable influence on the disposition of a case. En banc hearings and rehearings may also result from
rulings on a party's written motion or petition addressed to all the active
circuit judges.19
Although it has been said that the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit never sits en banc, 20 the court does provide for the procedure in
its rules. Petitions for rehearing must first be addressed to the original
hearing panel, 21 even if counsel intends to apply to the full court.22 If the
panel, either on party suggestion or its own motion, recommends a rehearing en banc, the chief judge polls all of the active circuit judges. 23 In
addition, any nonsitting circuit judge may obtain a canvassing of the full
court after the panel has denied a rehearing. 24 If there is no request for
a vote on an en banc application within seven days, it is automatically
denied by the chief judge. 25 Unlike the judges of the District of Columbia
Circuit, Second Circuit judges do not circulate opinions to their colleagues
before filing.26 Informal discussion of cases between panel members and
15 Comment, The En Banc Procedures of the United States Courts of Appeals,
21 U. Car. L. REv. 447, 451 (1954).
16 Stephens, Shop Talk Concerning the Business of the Court, 20 J.D.C.B.A.

105, 108 (1953).
'7

See Stephens, supra note 16, at 109; Note, supra note 13, at 485.

18 "The stage at which en banc action is most likely to be undertaken by the
court . . . is between the original hearing and the decision by the hearing panel,
for it is at this point that the issues presented are brought to the attention of each
judge . . . ." Note, supra note 13, at 484.
19 Stephens, supra note 16, at 108-09; Comment, supra note 15, at 452.
See Lopinsky v. Hertz Drive-Ur-Self Sys., Inc., 194 F.2d 422, 429 (2d Cir.
1951) (concurring opinion); Note, supra note 13, at 486-87. But see United States
v. Gori, 282 F.2d 43 (2d Cir. 1960) for an example of a Second Circuit en banc case.
20

25(b).
Letter From Hon. J. Edward Lumbard, Chief Judge, Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, Dec. 28, 1961.
232D CiR. R. 25(b).
24 Letter From Chief Judge Lumbard, supra note 21.
212D CiR. R.
22

25

Ibid.

26Ibid. There does appear to have been one exception. See United States v.
Gori, 282 F.2d 43, 44 (2d Cir. 1960), aff'd, 367 U.S. 364 (1961), in which draft
opinions were circulated when the panel was unable to resolve its own disagreement.
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nonsitting judges, however, may to27some extent serve the same function
as the circulation of draft opinions.
The Third Circuit has both formal rules of court2s and an informal
practice dealing with en banc procedure. The court has occasionally
ordered an initial hearing en banc prior to panel assignment, but only in
cases of public importance which have attracted much attention.- Whether
to sit en banc is more frequently determined in the interim between panel
argument and filing of an opinion. At that time, a draft opinion is circulated to all active circuit judges; at the request of a majority, the case will
be scheduled for en banc rehearing.30 Rehearing en banc may also be
ordered after formal panel decision, usually at the petition of the losing
party, although the en banc ruling may be sua sponte. 3' A party's petition
is circulated to panel members and nonsitting judges. 32 Panel members
33
are required to vote on whether to grant the petition for rehearing,
whereas nonpanel members may vote for or against a rehearing en banc,
or they may, and often do, defer to the panel on the desirability of panel
rehearing.3 4 If four active circuit judges vote for en banc rehearing, it will
be ordered by the opinion-writing judge. 35 If four votes are not cast for
rehearing en banc, the most that can be achieved is a panel rehearing.386
The Fifth Circuit is unique in having a rule of court which delimits
the types of cases meriting en banc consideration. To be heard en banc,
a case must present novel issues or be one which, if left with the panel,
might result in inconsistent decisions within the circuit.3 7 En banc requests
from a member of the court receive different treatment from petitions by
a party; the former are immediately considered by the full court whereas
the latter must first go to the panel.3 8 Although draft opinions are not cir97

28

29

See Letter From Chief Judge Lumbard, supra note 21.
See 3D CmR. R. 4-5, 33.
See Mars, Hearing and Rehearing Cases in Banc, 14 F.R.D. 91, 93 (1954);

Letter From Hon. John Biggs, Jr., Chief Judge, Court of Appeals for the Third

Circuit, Dec. 29, 1961.

S0 See Maris, stpra note 29, at 93-94; Note, supra note 13, at 484.
21 Mars, supra note 29, at 94.
32 This procedure is followed even though a party in requesting a rehearing does
not specifically request rehearing en banc. Ibid.
33 Id. at 95.
34 Ibid.; Note,

supra note 13, at 485.

Letter From Chief Judge Biggs, supra note 29. But since there are now eight
circuit judges in the Third Circuit, see note I supra, a vote of five judges will probably
be required.
36 Maris, supra note 29, at 95. There seems to be a standard Third Circuit form
of disposition for denying rehearings en banc. See, e.g., Brown v. Dravo Corp., 258
F.2d 704, rehearing denied, 258 F.2d 709 (3d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 960
(1959); Bishop v. Bishop, 257 F.2d 495, rehearing denied, 257 F.2d 501 (3d Cir.
1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 914 (1959).
37
5TH Cm. R. 25a.
3S See Letter From Hon. Elbert P. Tuttle, Chief Judge, Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit, Dec. 26, 1961. See also 5TH CIR. R. 25a.
35
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culated, informal discussion between panel and nonpanel members is
common.3 9 As a result of such discussion, a nonsitting judge may ask the
40
chief judge to canvass the court on whether to rehear a case en banc.
If en banc rehearing is not then ordered, it may be ordered after panel
decision. This order usually results from a party's petition directed to the
hearing panel. If the panel unanimously decides against such a hearing,
the matter is closed.41 A majority of the panel is not required, however,
to bring the question before the full court-any member of the panel may
request a poll of the court by the chief judge. 42 Sittings of the Fifth Circuit
43
en banc seldom exceed two in a year.
En banc procedure in the Sixth Circuit is difficult to discern. The
court's rule seems to be no more than a restatement of the statute which
authorizes the courts of appeals to sit en banc," and it has been said that
the Sixth Circuit "has no rule or policy on this matter . . . . 4 Circulation of draft opinions among nonsitting judges apparently does not give
them the right to request en banc consideration; they can only make suggestions which the opinion writer may accept or disregard. 46 All petitions
for rehearing-by the panel or en banc-are directed to the hearing panel.
The cases reveal that hearing panels either cannot or will not recommend
a vote of all the judges on whether to rehear a case en banc. One panel
has said, "with regard to rehearings en banc, where the appeal is decided
by a regular court of appeals, consisting of three judges only, a petition to
rehear will not be considered by the court en banc . . . . 47 There is
reason to believe that in practice, if not in theory, the Sixth Circuit has
the en banc process 48 and left the federal statute
practically eliminated
49
unimplemented.
The Eighth Circuit rarely sits en banc, perhaps because the court is
so "closely-knit" and differences of opinion do not often occur. 50 A court
See Letter From Chief Judge Tuttle, supra note 38.
Apparently, a nonsitting judge may also communicate directly with his colleagues on the question. Ibid.
39

40
41

See ibid.

42 Ibid.
43
44

Note, supra note 13, at 486.
Compare 6TH CIR. R. 3(1) with 28 U.S.C. §46 (1958).

45 Note, supra note 13, at 487. According to Chief Judge Miller, the court has
never sat en banc during his sixteen years of service. Letter From Hon. Shackelford
Miller, Jr., Chief Judge, Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Jan. 8, 1962.
46 See ibid.
47National Bank v. Wayne Oakland Bank, 252 F.2d 537, 544 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 830 (1958) ; accord, Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Glenn L. Martin
Co., 229 F.2d 434 (6th Cir. 1955) (per curiam) ; NLRB v. Cambria Clay Prod. Co.,
229 F.2d 433 (6th Cir. 1955).
48 "We have occasional requests for an in banc rehearing when the losing party
feels that our ruling is out of line with the ruling in another circuit or that it has
incorrectly applied a ruling of the Supreme Court. We do not grant such an in banc
rehearing." Letter From Chief Judge Miller, supra note 45.
49 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1958) ; see Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R.,
345 U.S. 247, 260-61 (1953).
50 Letter From Hon. Harvey M. Johnsen, Chief Judge, Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit, Jan. 19, 1962.
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rule provides that rehearings, by panel or by the court en banc, will be
granted only when it can be shown that the court overlooked "some controlling matter of law or fact." 51 A majority of the active judges may
designate a case for en banc hearing before it is assigned to a panel, 52 but it
is not clear whether judge or litigant initiates such a step.
Unique to the Eighth Circuit is an automatic procedure for en bane
consideration when a panel undertakes to overrule a fairly recent decision
of another panel.5 3

When a litigant requests a rehearing en banc, the

request, like petitions for panel rehearing, must be submitted to the panel.54
The full court will not consider the matter unless upon recommendation
of a majority of the panel,5 5 unlike the Fifth Circuit in which the request
of only one panel member is necessary to bring the question to the attention
of the full court.56

In the Ninth Circuit, regardless of whether en banc consideration is
requested after a case is assigned to a panel or after formal panel decision,
the panel makes the initial ruling on the advisability of en bane hearing or
rehearing.57 Although draft opinions are not circulated, the request for
en banc consideration may come from a nonsitting judge.58 If a majority
of the panel decides that the case is appropriate for en bane consideration,
the panel asks the chief judge to withdraw assignment of the case to it.
This request is ruled on by all of the active judges. An affirmative response
results in en bane consideration; a negative response returns the case to
the panel.5 9
It is not uncommon in the Ninth Circuit for a request for rehearing
en bane to be made simultaneously with a petition for panel rehearing.6
This practice makes it difficult to separate the two very different questions
of whether to rehear a case and whether rehearing should be by panel or

en banc. 6 1

Panel judges may be satisfied with the correctness of their

51 8TH CIR. R. 15(a).
52 See Comment, sypra note 15, at 453.
53 Letter From Chief Judge Johnsen, supra note 50.
54
8TH CIR. R. 15 (e); cf. Magidson v. Duggan, 219 F.2d 946 (8th Cir. 1955)
(per curiam).
55 Letter From Chief Judge Johnsen, smipra note 50.
56 See note 42 supra and accompanying text. It is difficult to evaluate these two
approaches in the absence of data concerning results in practice. If it is unlikely that
after a two-to-one panel decision one of the majority will side with the dissenter in
seeking a rehearing en banc, then the procedure of the Eighth Circuit will result in
less use of the en banc process than that of the Fifth Circuit. But there may be merit
in a practice which leaves the full court free of the question unless a dissenter can
convince at least one member of the majority of the necessity of a rehearing en banc.
57 96ru CIR. R. 23.
"[O]nce a case has been assigned to a particular panel it
thereafter belongs to that panel exclusively and must reach its final determination
through the judgment of that three-man division alone." Note, supra note 13, at 487.
58 There is reason to believe that requests from litigants are generally unsuccessful.
Yet, as the Supreme Court indicated, the litigant is often the one most likely to be
aware of reasons justifying en banc treatment. Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western
Pac. 59R.R., 345 U.S. 247, 261 (1953).
9TH CIa. R. 23.
60 See William H. Banks Warehouses, Inc. v. Watt, 205 F.2d 44 (9th Cir.),
remanded in light of the Western Pacific case, 345 U.S. 932 (1953).
61 See Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R., 345 U.S. 247, 262-63

(1953).
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decision and deny panel rehearing; but they may recommend rehearing
62
en banc because of panel conflict or the importance of the particular case.
63
Generally, a Ninth Circuit panel handles both issues in one opinion, but
this does not mean that the panel has failed to make the needed separation.
In denying a rehearing en banc on remand of the Western Pac. R.R. Corp.
v. Western Pac. R.R. case, 4 the panel was concerned with the possibility
that rehearing en banc might be justified although panel rehearing would
serve no purpose,6 5 which suggests that the court appreciated the different
issues involved. 66
In one case,67 a Ninth Circuit panel, upon .petition for rehearing en
banc, reversed its own decision while denying the rehearing, in effect
making a redetermination without an actual rehearing. As the dissent
pointed out, until a rehearing is formally granted, the opposing party has
no knowledge of the grounds on which it is sought. 68 The court acted,
therefore, after being shown only one side of the question.6 9
The Tenth Circuit has a rule of record which provides that all applications for hearing or rehearing en banc will be considered by all the active
circuit judges, and, in accordance with the federal statute, 70 an application
is granted only if approved by a majority of the judges.71 The request
need not come from a party but may be sua sponte. 72
The rule of record is apparently less important than the informal
approach adopted by the Tenth Circuit judges. Draft opinions are circulated, and if a nonsitting judge comments on the substance of a proposed
opinion, consideration is given to whether the case should be heard en
banc.7 3 Rehearing en banc may be ordered even though the panel is "fairly
certain" of its decision. 4 The distinction between rehearing en banc and
panel rehearing is recognized. There seems to be a certain attitude in the
62 Ibid.

63 See William H. Banks Warehouses, Inc. v. Watt, 205 F.2d 44 (9th Cir.),
rmanded, 345 U.S. 932 (1953).
64 206 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1953).
65 The court denied the rehearing en banc because there was no intracircuit conflict and the case was not sufficiently significant. These are the appropriate tests for
en banc rehearing as opposed to panel rehearing. Cf. Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v.
Western Pac. R. R., 205 F.2d 374, 376 (9th Cir. 1953) (concurring opinion).
66 Although a panel may in one opinion deny both panel rehearing and rehearing
en banc, it has been argued that the panel may only decide the en banc question after
it has decided to grant a rehearing. The result of such an interpretation of the Ninth
Circuit rule would mean that if a panel decided that panel rehearing was not justified,
it could not proceed to the question of the propriety of reconsideration by the full
court. Ly Shew v. Dulles, 219 F.2d 413, 421 (9th Cir. 1954) (dissenting opinion).
67 Ly Shew v. Dulles, 219 F.2d 413 (9th Cir. 1954).
68
Id. at 416-17 (dissenting opinion).
69 Ibid.
7D28 U.S.C. §46(c) (1958).
71 10TH CiR. R. 20(7).
'72 Ibid.
73 Letter From Hon. Alfred P. Murrah, Chief Judge, Court of Appeals for the

Tenth Circuit, Dec. 27, 1961.
74 Ibid.
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circuit that cases which deserve en banc consideration may be "intuitively"
discovered without resort to formal procedure. 75 Such an approach may
indicate an appreciation of the en banc process, but is unlikely to provide
adequate guidance for litigants.
II.

LITIGANT REQUEST FOR EN BANC CONSIDERATION

The courts of appeals are divided on the question of whether requests
by a litigant for hearing or rehearing en banc should first be heard by
the hearing panel, or should go directly to the full court. The practice of
one group of courts which delegates to the panel an unreviewable power
to deny en banc consideraion is unsatisfactory. 76 The source of the panel
conflict which the en banc process was designed to resolve is not always a
doctrinal clash between panels; conflict may arise because one panel sees a
distinction between two results which the litigant and perhaps the remainder of the court cannot accept as valid. In such a situation, it is
undesirable to permit those judges already convinced of the validity of
the distinction to determine that issue conclusively.
When a litigant's request for en banc consideration is immediately
brought to the attention of the full court, nonsitting judges still receptive
to adversary argument may then participate in a final decision of the en
banc question. However, if no method is developed to screen petitions,
litigant request may become pro forma and burdensome for the full court.
To diminish possible abuse, a court rule might be adopted which requires
a concise statement by the litigant in support of a claim of panel conflict to
which the panel could append appropriate comments or recommendations.
Such a procedure would ensure that nonsitting judges have the issue concisely framed with all necessary facts before them.
The Western Pacific proposal 77 that litigants be able to suggest en
banc determination without petitioning for formal court action is impractical, particularly when such requests are disposed of by the full court.
Formal procedure established by court rule is necessary to regulate the flow
of en banc demands from litigants and to adequately inform them of when
and under what circumstances such demands are appropriate.
In all circuits, a litigant may seek an en banc sitting before the panel
has made a formal decision. Yet until such decision, there is no overt
conflict which the litigant can show to justify convening the full court.
And if the case is one which has attracted enough public attention to
warrant initial full court hearing, this is normally apparent at the time the
case first reaches the court of appeals. In the absence of any other justification, therefore, the litigant should not be permitted to seek an en banc
75 Ibid.

76
See Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R., 345 U.S. 247, 272 (1953)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
77 Id. at 262.
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sitting after a case has been assigned to a panel but before it has been
formally decided.
Although generally a litigant should be able to seek a hearing or rehearing en banc only if there is intracircuit conflict, other reasons might be
sufficient in certain cases. When a case which has attracted much publicity
or which involves a large sum of money 7s first reaches the court of appeals
but has not yet been assigned to a panel, a litigant should be able to petition
for en banc hearing on the theory that in important cases more judges are
needed to increase the probability of a correct decision. Most of the
circuits already provide such a procedure, although it is rarely used, probably because these cases are by their very nature uncommon. Because of
their uniqueness, the cases should be easily recognizable by the court;
therefore, preliminary petitions would not unduly impose on judicial time,
particularly if pro forma denials are used.
In some cases, the en banc procedure could be simplified by eliminating the need for litigant request. One circuit already has a rule which
provides for automatic rehearing en banc in certain cases. 79 Often, an
opinion writer has stated that although the panel may not agree with the
reasoning being expressed therein, it is bound by the decision of a prior
panel of the same circuit until that decision is overruled by the court en
banc. 80 When two of the three panel members in a given case feel similarly
constrained, the case should be automatically referred to the full court to
resolve this latent conflict and prevent any future overt panel conflict. In
addition, a panel may determine that two earlier panel decisions have already created a conflict, and, if the panel is willing to certify to that effect,
the case might be sent to the full court without any party petition. In fact,
the practice might parallel the federal statutory procedure for certification
of questions of law from the courts of appeals to the Supreme Court.8 1
Federal certification was originally used only when there was a division
of opinion of the circuit court judges.82

III. PARTICULAR PROBLEMS OF EN BANC PROCEDURE
A. Judges Other Than Active Circuit Judges
One problem which sometimes complicates en banc procedure concerns
the status of judges other than active circuit judges-district court judges
temporarily assigned to circuit duty 83 and retired circuit judges.8 4 These
78
79
80

See id. at 270-71; 5TH CI. R. 25a.
See note 53 supra and accompanying text.

Mallory v. United States, 259 F.2d 801 (D.C. Cir. 1958) ; Thompson v. Thompson, 244 F.2d 374 (D.C. Cir. 1957) ; United States v. United States Vanadium Corp.,
230 F.2d 646 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 939 (1956).
81 See 28 U.S.C. § 1254(3) (1958).
82 See 2 Stat. 159 (1802).
83
District court judges may be assigned to circuit duty by the chief judge of a

circuit pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 292 (Supp. 1961).
84 Retired circuit judges may, if they desire, be assigned to judicial duties within
their circuit. 28 U.S.C.A. § 294 (Supp. 1961).
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judges are presently excluded from sitting on the court en banc. The en
banc statute specifically limits the en banc court to active circuit judges s5
and thereby obviously excludes district court judges. Because of the ambiguity of "active" in certain situations, it was necessary for the Supreme
Court to determine that a retired circuit judge cannot sit on the court en
banc even if he heard the case as a panel member before retirement.8 6
Basically, uniformity is the goal of the en banc process. Changes in the
composition of a court often bring changes to the law which undermine
uniformity. Naturally, court changes resulting from illness, death, or
retirement are unavoidable, but changing composition should not be encouraged by permitting judges who may not be sitting when the same issue
arises again 8 7 to participate in a conclusive en banc determination.
District court judges and retired circuit judges also create a problem
when they indirectly participate in the en banc process by sitting on a panel
with the unreviewable power to deny en banc rehearing. In the one case
in which the issue arose, the propriety of district court judges sitting on
such panels was upheld.88 However, the statute commits the en banc
power-the power to sit en banc and the power to determine when to sit
en banc-to active circuit judges only.89 If district court judges and retired
circuit judges should not sit on the court en banc, they should not be
allowed to sit on a panel with the power to preclude full court decision.
The impropriety of allowing the panel which decided the case to conclusively determine the en banc issue has been discussed; 90 permitting judges
other than active members of the circuit to participate in that determination aggravates an already unsatisfactory situation.
B. The Evenly Divided Et Banc Court

Another en banc problem arose recently in a Second Circuit case in
which the en banc court was evenly divided on the merits after a panel had
reversed the trial court.91 The full court determined that the split decision
en banc had the effect of affirming the trial court.92 A split decision by an
en bane court cannot ensure the uniformity normally resulting from en banc
8528 U.S.C. §46(c) (1958).
86 United States v. American-Foreign S.S. Corp., 363 U.S. 685 (1960).

This
decision was anticipated by the Judicial Conference which urged legislation which
would have permitted retired circuit judges to sit on the en banc court. See 1959
ANN. REP. OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 9-10; H.R. 5255, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
87 A district judge may not be assigned to circuit duty the next time an en banc
hearing is sought, and a retired circuit judge may have terminated his voluntary
service.
88

Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R., 206 F.2d 495, 497 (9th Cir.

1953).
89 See Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R., 345 U.S. 247, 261 (1953).
90 See text accoipanying note 76 supra.
91
Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 50, Am. Bakery Workers, 294 F.2d 399 (2d
Cir.), aff'd, 370 U.S. 254 (1962).
02 Ibid. The propriety of this en banc procedure was not ruled on by the Supreme
Court. 370 U.S. at 255 n.1.
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decision since any change in the composition of the court may alter the
result of a similar case in the future. Correctness of decision in the particular case becomes, therefore, more significant than the goal of uniformity,
and in theory, correctness of decision is more apt to occur when the view
of a majority of the judges who have heard the case prevails. Affirming
the panel in this case would have given conclusive weight to the votes of
the original panel members. But by affirming the trial court, the Second
Circuit reached the result supported by a majority consisting of one-half
of the active circuit judges and the district court judge who originally
heard the case.
In some cases involving split decisions it might be best to certify the
disputed question to the Supreme Court. When circuit judges are evenly
divided over a particular question of law which raises an important federal
issue, the question is probably ripe and suitable for Supreme Court resolution. The cases in"which an even division might occur would be rare 93
and therefore not burdensome for the high Court.
C. Limitation of Issues
May a rehearing en banc be limited to certain issues or must it be a
rehearing of the entire case? In Herzog v. United States,"4 a panel rejected several claims of error by the defendant and affirmed his conviction.
Because of possible conflict with an earlier panel decision, the court granted
a rehearing en banc on the one issue pertinent to the possible conflict.
Without resolving that issue, on the ground that any possible error on the
issue was non-prejudicial, the court en banc affirmed the trial court. In
response to the dissent's contention that the court en banc could not limit
itself to only one of the many issues presented to the panel, 95 the chief
judge in a concurring opinion analogized to the Supreme Court practice
of limiting issues on certiorari and argued that the court en banc had the
same power.9 6 Although the court of appeals en banc should be able to
limit the issues before it so as to decide only those questions on which there
was panel conflict, the certiorari analogy is not entirely apt. There
is a fundamental distinction between the relationship of the court en banc
to a panel and that of the Supreme Court to lower courts. Because it is
reviewing decisions of inferior courts, the Supreme Court has greater
flexibility in disposing of cases than have the courts of appeals sitting en
banc. In addition to reversing or affirming, it may remand the case; therefore, when it limits its consideration to certain issues, its decision can be
integrated into the lower court decision of other issues in the case on
remand. But there is no statutory indication that the courts of appeals
93At present, only three circuits have an even number of active circuit judges.
28 U.S.C.A. § 44 (Supp. 1961).
94235 F.2d 664 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 944 (1956).
95Id. at 668. (Stephens, J., dissenting).
96 Id. at 668-69. (Denman, C.J., concurring).

1962]

EN BANC PROCEDURE

sitting en banc are superior tribunals to the panels and may therefore
remand cases to them. The purpose of en banc rehearings is not panel
supervision but resolution of panel conflict.
IV. EXPANDED USE OF THE EN BANC COURT

Hearings and rehearings en banc are not peculiar to the federal courts
of appeals. State supreme courts often sit en banc, 97 and for purposes
other than the resolution of panel conflict. Perhaps, therefore, use of the
en banc process in the federal courts of appeals might also be expanded.
In one case in the Ninth Circuit, a party moved for a rehearing en
banc on the grounds of intercircuit conflict.98 The court rejected the
motion, possibly because it felt that such a conflict could be resolved by
the Supreme Court. Actually, conflict between circuits might be a sufficient justification for a rehearing en banc, especially since the court en banc
might so redetermine the case as to erase the former intercircuit conflict and
thereby ease the burden on the Supreme Court. Even if en banc rehearing
failed to remove the conflict, at least it would persuasively indicate that the
case merited Supreme Court consideration.
The use of the en banc procedure might also be expanded to cover
more cases whose interest transcends that of the litigants. Decision by the
full court of controversial disputes which arouse public feeling and involve
fundamental policies would not only increase the probability of correct
determination, but would also enhance the acceptability of the judicial
ruling in the community,
V. CONCLUSION

Because the judicial workload is generally increasing, sittings en banc
must remain the exception and panel decision the rule. But there are
certain cases which require a determination en banc to resolve panel conflict
and to utilize the full strength of the court to ensure a sound decision,
Thus, en banc procedural rules must be geared to facilitate recognition and
disposition of these appropriate cases without undue procedural complexity,
Judah I. Labovitz
97 See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 2; ALA. CODE tit.
CODE ANN. §§ 684.1-.3 (1950).

13, §§ 10-13 (1958); IowA

98 Stamphill v. Johnston, 136 F.2d 291 (9th Cir.). rehearing denied, 136 F.2d 292
(9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 766 (1943).

